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Science, Politics, Law, and the Arc of the Clean Water 
Act: The Role of Assumptions in the Adoption of a 
Pollution Control Landmark 
Robert L. Glicksman  
Matthew R. Batzel  
INTRODUCTION 
As the 1960s drew to a close, the nation‘s surface water resources 
were heavily polluted. In the first of a three-part series of articles on 
public regulation of water quality, Professor William Hines found 
that ―[p]ollution invades our waters in such a noxious variety of 
forms as to nearly defy description.‖1 According to Hines, most of the 
surface waters within the United States were only marginally suitable 
for even low-quality uses such as irrigation, stockwatering, and 
industrial intake, ―and many of our waters [were] so contaminated as 
to be offensive to sight and smell.‖2 The problem, however, extended 
beyond aesthetic niceties. Hines cited to warnings by public health 
officials that water pollution rendered the country vulnerable to 
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 1. N. William Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality, Part 
I: State Pollution Control Programs, 52 IOWA L. REV. 186, 186 (1966) [hereinafter Hines I]. 
The other two components of Hines‘s trilogy are N. William Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: 
Public Regulation of Water Quality, Part II: Interstate Arrangements for Pollution Control, 52 
IOWA L. REV. 432 (1966), and Part III: The Federal Effort, 52 IOWA L. REV. 799 (1967) 
[hereinafter Hines III]. 
 2. Hines I, supra note 1, at 189. Professor Hines defined water pollution in terms of 
unsuitability of the resource for desired human uses. Id. at 188 (stating that ―pollution of water 
simply means that the quality of the resource is lower than that reasonably required for the uses 
to which it would otherwise be put‖). 
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serious health problems arising from ―the disease carrying capacity of 
our polluted watercourses.‖3 He asserted that the need to control 
water quality ―raise[d] a kaleidoscopic array of scientific, economic, 
political and social issues,‖4 and he characterized the effort to control 
water pollution as ―the latest problem in a long series of conflicts 
between private enterprise and public interest in the use of natural 
resources.‖5 
Congress responded to the water pollution problem described by 
Professor Hines by adopting the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments of 1972, now known as the Clean Water Act 
(―CWA‖).6 On its face, the CWA is an ambitious effort to rid the 
nation‘s surface waters of pollution. Its stated objective is ―to restore 
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation‘s waters,‖7 and its goal is to eliminate the discharge of 
pollutants into navigable waters by 1985.
8
 In the interim, the statute 
strives, ―wherever attainable,‖ to provide for waters capable of 
protecting fish and wildlife and supporting recreation (the so-called 
―fishable-swimmable waters‖ goal).9 Nearly four decades after its 
enactment, surface water quality has improved considerably, but 
serious problems remain, and the goal of eliminating surface water 
pollution seems chimerical. 
This Article examines the assumptions upon which Congress 
relied in enacting the CWA and the extent to which these 
assumptions have been borne out or belied as the federal and state 
governments have implemented their CWA responsibilities in the 
quest to achieve acceptably clean water. Part I briefly traces the 
 
 3. Id. at 189. According to the Centers for Disease Control, hundreds of thousands of 
people become ill and hundreds die each year in the United States due to exposure to 
pathogenic organisms in drinking water. Chemical pollution also gives rise to public health 
concerns. See ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, DAVID L. MARKELL, WILLIAM W. BUZBEE, DANIEL R. 
MANDELKER & A. DAN TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 801 (5th 
ed. 2007). 
 4. Hines I, supra note 1, at 186. 
 5. Id. at 195. 
 6. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006). A year before the publication of 
Professor Hines‘s trilogy, Congress enacted the Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 
79 Stat. 903, which was a predecessor of the modern CWA. 
 7. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006). 
 8. Id. § 1251(a)(1). 
 9. Id. § 1251(a)(2). 
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development of federal water pollution control legislation before 
1972, highlighting the deficiencies that contributed to the need for a 
new approach in 1972. Part II examines the scientific and technical, 
political, and legal assumptions that helped shape the 1972 CWA in 
order to determine whether the failure to achieve fully the statute‘s 
goals is inherent in the statute‘s design or is the result of the law‘s 
incomplete implementation. Part III provides an assessment of how 
water quality conditions today compare both with those that existed 
in 1972 and with the goals that Congress identified in the CWA. The 
Article concludes by speculating about the future direction of water 
pollution control law. We conclude that a surprisingly large share of 
the assumptions upon which Congress built the CWA were valid and 
have helped to make the statute an environmental success story. The 
statute‘s failure to perform even more admirably than it has is due 
largely to a lack of legislative clarity in addressing the role of 
wetlands in preserving the integrity of aquatic ecosystems and to 
Congress‘s unwillingness to adopt, or force the states to adopt, 
measures to control nonpoint source pollution. 
I. FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL LEGISLATION BEFORE 
1972 
The story of pre-1972 federal water pollution legislation is one of 
incremental enhancement of federal responsibility and control. 
Although the Supreme Court in a series of decisions in the 1960s
10
 
converted the River and Harbors Act of 1899
11
 into a vehicle for 
controlling water pollution, the statute was adopted primarily as a 
device to protect navigation.
12
 The first significant piece of 
legislation adopted with the principal aim of reducing water pollution 
was the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948.
13
 Before World 
War II, water pollution control was regarded as a state and local 
 
 10. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966); United States v. Republic 
Steel Co., 362 U.S. 482 (1960). See also United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Co., 411 U.S. 655, 
670–71 (1973). 
 11. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2006). That statute prohibited discharge of ―refuse matter‖ without a 
permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 
 12. GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 586–87. 
 13. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948). 
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responsibility.
14
 The 1948 statute expanded the federal government‘s 
role by, among other things, authorizing it to take action to abate 
interstate pollution.
15
 By the mid-1960s, Congress was ready to 
further expand the federal role, in part because of the ―almost total 
lack of enforcement‖ of the 1948 statute, which depended on 
cooperation by the states.
16
 In addition, by that time the northern 
states were concerned that southern and western states were trying to 
lure industry with lax regulation. They therefore supported the 
establishment of a federal regulatory floor to combat the further 
migration of industry to the south and west.
17
 
The Water Quality Act of 1965 required all states to designate 
intended uses for interstate water bodies within their jurisdiction and 
then adopt water quality standards that would allow each body to 
meet its intended use.
18
 States also had to craft plans to implement the 
standards. The standards were, in theory, enforceable by the federal 
government.
19
 The statute failed to make a significant dent in 
interstate water pollution. By 1970, half of the states still had not 
adopted the water quality standards required by the 1965 Act.
20
 Even 
when the states committed to meeting their statutory responsibilities, 
they often lacked the scientific information necessary to determine 
the appropriate pollutant concentrations needed to support the 
designated use and to convert the maximum concentrations into a 
series of effluent limits on individual dischargers. These difficulties 
hampered both the establishment and enforcement of effluent limits, 
as dischargers contested cause-and-effect linkages between their 
discharges and extant water quality problems at both stages of the 
process.
21
  
 
 14. GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 586. 
 15. Id. at 587. 
 16. S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3672. 
 17. GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 587. 
 18. Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903. 
 19. JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 
141 (2d ed. 2007). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id.; Oliver A. Houck, Tales from a Troubled Marriage: Science and Law in 
Environmental Policy, 17 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 163, 167 (2003); see also Khristine L. Hall, The 
Control of Toxic Pollutants under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 
1972, 63 IOWA L. REV. 609, 611–12 (1978) (―Establishing an effective water quality standard 
was a cumbersome process, and many states resisted implementing effective standards.‖). Carol 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/5
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The Senate Committee on Public Works, which had jurisdiction 
over the legislation that was eventually adopted as the 1972 CWA, 
concluded ―that the national effort to abate and control water 
pollution has been inadequate in every vital aspect.‖22 Some states 
 
Rose has described the ―tentative efforts‖ made by the states in the ―pre-history‖ stage before 
adoption of the CWA in 1972, noting that  
the states were supposed to set water quality standards for different bodies of water. 
But these . . . approaches did not in fact work very well to improve water quality. The 
problem was that once the standards were set, nothing much happened. It was just too 
hard to connect deterioration in water quality to any particular responsible party.  
Carol M. Rose, Environmental Law Grows up (More or Less), and What Science Can Do to 
Help, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 273, 277 (2005).  
 Cf. Kenneth M. Murchison, Learning from More than Five-and-a-Half Decades of Federal 
Water Pollution Control Legislation: Twenty Lessons for the Future, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 527, 534 (2005) (noting that before 1972 ―approximately half of the states had adopted 
water quality standards, but the federal legislation failed to compel meaningful progress toward 
achieving those standards‖); James R. Rasband, Priority, Probability, and Proximate Cause: 
Lessons from Tort Law About Imposing ESA Responsibility for Wildlife Harm on Water Users 
and Other Joint Habitat Modifiers, 33 ENVTL. L. 595, 600 n.11 (2003) (deeming pre-1972 
implementation of state water quality programs ―mostly a failure‖); Scott D. Anderson, 
Comment, Watershed Management and Nonpoint Source Pollution: The Massachusetts 
Approach, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 339, 342 (1999) (―[Prior to 1972] the practice of states 
establishing acceptable concentrations of pollutants for different water bodies did not result in 
noticeable improvements in water quality. . . . [N]ot only were few states setting specific water 
quality standards, but many problems arose when states implemented these standards—
including problems of determining when a discharge violated an established standard, and with 
identifying ways to allocate effluent limitations among different polluters. Moreover, industry 
commonly pressured states to reclassify their waterways to allow a greater pollutant load.‖); 
Ana M. Babigian, Note and Comment, Medical Waste: A Loaded Gun on the Verge of Firing: 
United States v. Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc., 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1063, 1065–66 
(arguing that the pre-1972 water quality standard ―system proved to be inadequate, since it 
possessed a limited, unclear scope, suffered from administrative problems, and lacked a 
permitting process‖). 
 22. S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 7 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3674. See also 
EPA v. Calif. ex rel. Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 203 (1976). One of the authors of 
this Article was reminded almost daily of the sorry state of the quality of some of the nation‘s 
surface water bodies, having grown up in the 1950s and 1960s within a mile of a river that, 
even in 2009, was described as ―[a] toxic cocktail of dioxin, sewage, heavy metals and 
industrial chemicals left behind by . . . factories, tanneries, smelters and refineries,‖ ―a toxic 
disgrace,‖ a river whose last ―increasingly foul and dispiriting [80] miles‖ devolve into ―a dark, 
malodorous industrial sink,‖ and ―a pretty decisive argument against human perfectibility.‖ 
Peter Applebome, In One Day, Saddening Reminders of a River’s Murky History, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 13, 2009, at A14. An environmental group spokesperson noted, however, that ―the river, 
however foul, is cleaner than it was when, like the [Cuyahoga] in Cleveland, it could catch 
fire.‖ Id. The quality of the Cuyahoga River near Cleveland, meanwhile, has improved 
markedly since the late 1960s and is now home to more than sixty species of fish. See 
Christopher Maag, From the Ashes of ’69, a River Reborn, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2009, at A18 
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had taken the initiative to respond to the water pollution problems 
that they had clearly identified and understood well with some 
success.
23
 Both industrial and municipal dischargers were continuing 
to dispose of large (and growing) quantities of waste into surface 
waters, however, and enforcement was so sporadic and ineffective 
that it failed to serve as a deterrent.
24
 Congress responded in 1972 by 
amending the 1948 and 1965 Acts through the adoption of the first 
version of the modern CWA. 
II. THE SCIENTIFIC, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL ASSUMPTIONS BEHIND 
THE 1972 CLEAN WATER ACT 
The Senate Committee on Public Works provided both the 
backdrop for and an explanation of the aims of the 1972 legislation. It 
denounced past federal water pollution control efforts as ―sporadic, 
inconsistent, and improvised on an ad hoc basis.‖25 It described the 
purpose of the 1972 CWA as the establishment of ―a comprehensive 
long-range policy for the elimination of water pollution, making it 
clear to industry and municipalities alike the pollution control 
 
(quoting a river specialist describing the river‘s ―amazing comeback‖). At the same time, forty 
years after the Cuyahoga caught fire on June 22, 1969, EPA denied a request to remove a large 
part of the river from the list of water bodies not meeting state water quality standards because 
it was still failing to meet EPA standards in eight of fourteen locations for determining whether 
a river is healthy (such as the number of fish advisories). Michael Scott, U.S. EPA: Cuyahoga 
River Has Made Strides but Stays on List of Polluted North American Waterways, CLEVELAND 
PLAIN DEALER, June 23, 2009, at B1. 
 23. EPA‘s initial national water quality inventory, which was conducted in 1973, found 
that there had been substantial improvement in water quality in major waterways over the last 
decade, at least with regard to the pollutants of greatest concern at the time: organic waste and 
bacteria. A. Myrick Freeman III, Water Pollution Policy, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 97, 114 (Paul R. Portney ed., 1990); Jonathan H. Adler, The 
Fable of Federal Environmental Regulation: Reconsidering the Federal Role in Environmental 
Protection, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 93, 96–97 (2004) [hereinafter Adler, Fable]. 
 24. William L. Andreen, Beyond Words of Exhortation: The Congressional Prescription 
for Vigorous Federal Enforcement of the Clean Water Act, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 202, 202–
03 (1987) [hereinafter Andreen, Exhortation] (―[C]onfronted by the twin evils of severe water 
quality degradation and a failed federal initiative to control it, Congress opted to discard the 
earlier federal program and chart a new, more effective course.‖); see also William L. Andreen, 
The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United States—State, Local, and Federal 
Efforts, 1789–1972: Part II, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 215, 261–62 (2003) [hereinafter Andreen, 
Evolution II] (quoting Senator Edmund Muskie‘s view that ―spotty‖ enforcement required a 
new approach involving ―tougher enforcement‖). 
 25. S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3758. 
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performance which will be expected over the next decade.‖26 The 
Act‘s ambitious objective, as indicated above, was to ―restore and 
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation‘s waters‖ through the elimination of all pollutant discharges 
by 1985.
27
 
In hindsight, the goal of eliminating all surface water pollution 
within thirteen years of the CWA‘s adoption appears to be wildly 
aspirational, and perhaps even to amount to foolhardy optimism. It is 
hard to escape the question of whether those who fashioned that goal 
operated under serious misconceptions about the nature of water 
pollution and an industrial society‘s ability to control it. This Part 
explores the assumptions that drove Congress to adopt the 1972 
CWA and how those assumptions affected the scope and character of 
the supposedly ―comprehensive‖ statutory program that emerged. 
A. Scientific and Technical Assumptions 
Policymakers must make numerous judgments when designing a 
pollution control program such as the CWA. Mistaken or misguided 
assumptions can sabotage a program before it gets off the ground. 
This section addresses the scientific and technical assumptions and 
determinations that seem to have driven Congress to adopt a statute 
the essential characteristics of which include a foundational ―no 
discharge‖ goal, an objective of restoring and maintaining aquatic 
ecosystem integrity, a first line of defense against water pollution that 
relies on a set of technology-based rather than water quality-based 
controls, a virtual failure to address nonpoint source pollution, and an 
aquatic development control program that fails to mention the term 
―wetlands‖ even once. 
1. The Viability of the ―No Discharge‖ Goal 
Did anyone who voted for the 1972 CWA really think the statute 
would be capable of eliminating all discharges of surface water 
pollution by 1985? If so, those persons clearly failed to anticipate the 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006). 
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scope of the task. Several competing theories suggest that the 
supporters of the CWA in Congress did not believe that the no 
discharge goal would become a reality by 1985. 
The first possibility is that those who crafted and voted for the no 
discharge goal did so not because they thought achieving it was a 
realistic possibility but because they sought to make a moral 
statement that pollution of the nation‘s water resources was 
unacceptable.
28
 There is some flavor of that sentiment in the 
legislative history. A Senate report attributes to the no discharge goal 
a desire to ―clearly establish that no one has the right to pollute—that 
pollution continues because of technological limits, not because of 
any inherent right to use the nation‘s waterways for the purpose of 
disposing of wastes.‖29 A related possibility is that the CWA‘s 
supporters knew full well that it would be impossible to meet the no 
discharge goal by 1985, but they codified such a lofty goal anyway so 
that when practical and political realities required a retreat from the 
stated goal, the result would nevertheless be acceptable water 
quality.
30
 Had the statute established a less absolute goal, the fallback 
position, too, would have been less protective.
31
 Yet another 
possibility is that the no discharge goal allowed those who voted for 
 
 28. SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 142–43 (describing ―moral outrage, not 
pragmatic cost-benefit considerations,‖ as the motivation behind federal pollution control 
legislation in the 1970s); see generally John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 
17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233 (1990). 
 29. S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3709; cf. Friends of 
the Everglades v. South-Florida Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210, 1226 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(noting that some of the CWA‘s substantive provisions ―do not comport with its broad purpose 
of restoring and maintaining the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation‘s 
waters. (Which may help explain why the Act‘s express goal of completely eliminating all 
discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters by 1985 was not met.)‖). 
 30. SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 142–43 (―Anticipating that industry and 
municipalities were likely to fight vigorous implementation of the CWA, Congress may have 
felt that the fishable-swimmable and ‗no discharge‘ goals would provide a valuable 
counterweight.‖); cf. DAVID M. DRIESEN & ROBERT W. ADLER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: A 
CONCEPTUAL AND PRAGMATIC APPROACH 123 (2007) (―A charitable explanation is that 
Congress believes that it is important to establish long-term environmental aspirations, but 
realizes that economic, technological, and other factors must be considered in providing for 
short-term progress toward those goals.‖). 
 31. The Senate report indicates that the Committee on Public Works regarded the no 
discharge goal as an important enforcement tool but recognized that the impracticality of efforts 
to halt all pollution immediately required an exception for discharges covered by valid permits. 
S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3709. 
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it to present themselves to constituents as protectors of the 
environment, while simultaneously assuring industries whose support 
they needed in future elections that the operative provisions of the 
statute fell far short of the stated aspirations.
32
 
But the CWA‘s legislative history suggests another reason why 
Congress may have codified a no discharge goal along with a set of 
substantive provisions clearly inadequate to the task.
33
 The legislative 
history reveals that the key House and Senate committees recognized 
that the no discharge goal would not be achieved, at least in the time 
frame spelled out in the statute. Both committees recognized the 
difficulty of implementing a no-discharge policy.
34
 Both intended that 
the no discharge goal serve as a kind of placeholder, until a study that 
the law required the National Academy of Sciences and the National 
Academy of Engineering to conduct provided further information that 
Congress could use to determine the next step.  
[That information would] assist the Nation in any decision on 
the proper enforcement mechanism to be established to support 
the goal, if appropriate, or a decision to refine the date for the 
attainment of the goal with greater precision, if required, or the 
extent of the exceptions to that goal, if any, or whether the 
costs associated with reaching this ultimate standard, in some 
instances, may far outweigh the benefits derived.
35
  
 
 32. DRIESEN & ADLER, supra note 30, at 123 (arguing that Congress may consciously 
refuse to adopt specific provisions adequate to achieve statutory goals ―for fear of alienating 
powerful constituents and other interest groups‖); cf. Nat‘l Wildlife Fed‘n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 
156, 178–79 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (―[A]s any student of the legislative process soon learns, it is one 
thing for Congress to announce a stated goal, and another for it to mandate full implementation 
of that goal.‖). 
 33. The CWA makes the discharge of any pollutant by any person unlawful, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1311(a) (2006), but explicitly exempts from that prohibition discharges covered by a permit 
issued by either the Environmental Protection Agency or a state to which EPA has delegated its 
permit-issuing authority. Id. §§ 1311(a), 1342(a)–(b). 
 34. S. REP. NO. 92-414, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3678; H.R. REP. NO. 92-
911, at 77 (1972). 
 35. S. REP. NO. 92-414, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3678; see also H.R. REP. 
NO. 92-911, at 77 (1972) (―At the conclusion of the study, with the appropriate information 
available, the Congress will be in a position to fully evaluate the implications of a no-discharge 
policy.‖). The requirement that states review and revise, as appropriate, their water quality 
standards at least once every three years beginning in 1972 also reflects the evolutionary nature 
of the statute. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(1) (2006). It should be noted that Congress retained the 
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 In the interim, the no discharge goal would provide an impetus for 
the Environmental Protection Agency (―EPA‖), state environmental 
agencies, and industry to support research that would generate the 
technology needed to achieve acceptable levels of water quality.
36
 
2. Equilibrium vs. Dynamic Ecosystem Conceptions 
The explanation for the appearance in the first section of the CWA 
of the goal of restoring and maintaining physical, chemical, and 
biological integrity is also contestable. It is now well established that 
Congress adopted many of the core environmental statutes of the 
1970s on the basis of the belief among most scientists and natural 
resource management policymakers that ecological systems tend 
toward a natural and necessary equilibrium.
37
 But the science of 
ecology has since experienced a ―paradigm shift.‖38 Instead of 
viewing natural systems as being in equilibrium or moving toward it, 
―[t]he contemporary paradigm recognizes that ecosystems are open 
and not necessarily in equilibrium. It recognizes disturbance to be a 
natural and necessary part of ecosystems.‖39 The prevailing current 
view also recognizes the inevitability of disturbances and the need for 
environmental management efforts to consider them, lest those 
 
no discharge goal in section 101(a)(1) even after it amended the CWA in 1977 and 1987. It may 
not have been politically feasible then to delete the highly visible no discharge goal, even 
though it was clear that it could not be achieved, and perhaps should not be legally enforceable. 
The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (―NPDES‖) permit program, id. § 1342, 
together with the extended deadlines for compliance with the Act‘s technology-based effluent 
limitations, made it clear that the no discharge goal was not the driving force behind day-to-day 
implementation of the statute. 
 36. S. REP. NO. 92-414, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3678. The National Water 
Commission, established by President Lyndon Johnson to study water quality problems, took a 
different view, deeming the no discharge goal unfeasible, ―destined to lead to public 
disappointment,‖ and reflective of the imputation of ―an extravagant social value to an abstract 
concept of water purity.‖ SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 142 (quoting NATIONAL 
WATER COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT: WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 70 (1973)). 
 37. See Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecological Science on 
American Law: An Introduction, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 863–69 (1994) (discussing 
equilibrium theory).  
 38. Judy L. Meyer, The Dance of Nature: New Concepts in Ecology, 69 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 875, 877 (1994). 
 39. Id. at 877. 
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efforts risk failing to preserve the resources in question in the long 
term.
40
 
If congressional policymakers were guided by the equilibrium 
paradigm in drafting the CWA, the statute‘s integrity goal would 
make sense. Some scholars attribute the integrity goal to adherence to 
the then-prevailing equilibrium paradigm.
41
 Both the text and the 
legislative history are consistent with that premise, at least in part. 
The statute defines pollution to mean ―the man-made or man-induced 
alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and radiological 
integrity of water.‖42 The Senate Committee explained that it added 
the definition to refine the concept of water quality, as measured by 
the natural integrity of the resource. Consistent with the equilibrium 
paradigm, the Committee asserted that 
[m]aintenance of such integrity requires that any changes in 
the environment resulting in a physical, chemical or biological 
change in a pristine water body be of a temporary nature, such 
that by natural processes, within a few hours, days or weeks, 
the aquatic ecosystem will return to a state functionally 
identical to the original.
43
 
It added that the national policy concerning water bodies that are 
not pristine should be to take steps resulting in changes toward a 
pristine state in which physical, chemical, and biological integrity can 
be said to exist. Restoration and maintenance of a pristine state would 
provide ―a stable biosphere that is essential to the well-being of 
human society.‖44 Likewise, the House Committee reported that the 
term ―integrity‖ was meant to refer ―to a condition in which the 
 
 40. Id. at 878–79. 
 41. See, e.g., RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 215 (2004) 
(contending that the CWA reflected the prevailing notion ―that nature was static and maintained 
an equilibrium or ‗balance‘‖). 
 42. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(19) (2006). Most of the CWA‘s substantive provisions are tied to 
the discharge of ―pollutants,‖ rather than to the occurrence of ―pollution.‖ See, e.g., id. 
§§ 1311(a), 1362(12). ―Pollutants‖ are defined by way of a list of examples, rather than by 
generic description. Id. § 1362(6). Some provisions refer to pollution, however. See, e.g., id. 
§ 1251(b) (reciting a policy of preserving the primary right and responsibility of the states ―to 
prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution‖). Moreover, the original name of the 1972 version of 
the CWA was the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments. 
 43. S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3742. 
 44. Id. 
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natural structure and function of ecosystems is maintained.‖45 A 
―natural‖ ecosystem, in turn, generally meant one with conditions 
that existed ―before the activities of man invoked perturbations which 
prevented the system from returning to its original state of 
equilibrium.‖46 The Committee‘s evocation of the equilibrium 
paradigm is unmistakable. 
The legislative history also demonstrates, however, that legislators 
recognized that even ecosystems without people experience 
disturbances that alter their nature. The House Committee pointed out 
that ―[e]cosystems themselves are dynamic, changing things. They 
undergo their own evolutionary changes, and these are ‗natural.‘‖47 It 
also provided examples of ―minor physical activities,‖ including ―the 
peturbations [sic] caused by earthquakes, landslides, hurricanes, 
floods, volcanic activity, and the like,‖ which result in ―changes 
[that] are part of the general order of things: the natural law that has 
existed since the planet began to support life.‖48 The Committee‘s 
goal was to prohibit activities that ―overtax‖ the ability of nature to 
adapt to these minor, natural perturbations.
49
  
It is an oversimplification, therefore, to regard the equilibrium 
model as the underpinning for the CWA‘s ecosystem integrity 
protection goal. If the House Committee missed something important, 
it may have been in assuming that the time scale in which the CWA 
would operate would reflect ―a relatively high degree of stability‖ in 
the absence of human intervention.
50
 The Committee recognized that 
evolutionary changes are ―natural,‖ but counted those changes in 
terms of ―geological‖ time.51 What the Committee seems to have 
underestimated is the degree to which ecosystems are engaged in a 
constant process of change, even in the absence of major, obvious 
natural or human disruptions, and that those changes can be measured 
in years or decades rather than just millennia.
52
 
 
 45. H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 76 (1972). 
 46. Id.   
 47. Id. at 77. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 76–77. 
 50. Id. at 77. 
 51. Id.  
 52. Professor Adler‘s contribution to this symposium argues that restoration of ecological 
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3. The Relationship between Surface Water and Groundwater 
When discussing the CWA‘s goals and scope, this Article has 
referred to surface water. The intended distinction is between surface 
water and groundwater. The CWA‘s core provision—the prohibition 
on unpermitted pollutant discharges—applies to ―navigable waters.‖53 
The Act then defines ―navigable waters‖ as ―the waters of the United 
States.‖54 That amorphous term has given rise to a series of 
controversial questions whose resolution largely determines the 
statute‘s scope.55 One of those is whether the discharge prohibition 
applies to groundwater pollution or only to discharges into surface 
water bodies. The courts have reached inconsistent conclusions on 
this question.
56
 One recent district court decision concluded that 
―when Congress enacted the CWA, it decided not to attempt the 
general regulation of discharges to groundwater.‖57 It added, 
however, that ―the decision not to comprehensively regulate 
groundwater as part of the CWA does not require the conclusion that 
Congress intended to exempt groundwater from all regulation, 
particularly when the introduction of pollutants into the groundwater 
 
health and resilience of the nation‘s waters should be the focus of future CWA implementation. 
The concept of resilience accepts that ecosystems are subject to change, but seeks to ensure that 
healthy natural systems have the capacity to resist radical changes that move them to entirely 
different states. Robert W. Adler, Resilience, Restoration, and Sustainability: Revisiting the 
Fundamental Principles of the Clean Water Act, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 139 (2010). 
 53. Section 301(a) of the CWA bars the discharge of a pollutant without or in violation of 
a permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006). The statute defines ―discharge of a pollutant‖ to mean 
―any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.‖ Id. § 1362(12)(A). 
 54. Id. § 1362(7). The term also includes the territorial seas. See id. § 1362(8) (defining 
territorial seas). 
 55. See, e.g., infra notes 83–91 and accompanying text (discussing the applicability of the 
dredge and fill permit program to wetlands). 
 56. Compare Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1178–81 (D. Idaho 
2001) (holding that the CWA applies to groundwater that is hydrologically connected to surface 
water), with Umatilla Waterquality Protective Ass‘n v. Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 
1312, 1320 (D. Or. 1997) (holding that the CWA does not apply to discharges into 
groundwater, even if the water is hydrologically connected to surface water). A recent summary 
of the cases appears in Hernandez v. Esso Standard Oil Co. (Puerto Rico), 599 F. Supp. 2d 175 
(D.P.R. 2009). The court interpreted the cases as establishing that ―‗isolated /tributary 
groundwater,‘ such as confined wells, has been unequivocally excluded from the Act,‖ id. at 
179, but also noted that there is a split of opinion on whether tributary groundwater that 
allegedly migrates from groundwater back into surface water is covered, id. at 180–81 (citing 
cases). 
 57. Hernandez, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 181. 
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adversely affects adjoining river surface water.‖58 The court therefore 
held that ―the CWA extends federal jurisdiction over groundwater 
that is hydrologically connected to surface waters that are themselves 
waters of the United States.‖59 
If the courts that have found congressional intent to exclude or 
greatly limit coverage of groundwater have interpreted the statute 
correctly, one would expect to be able to discern a reason for treating 
surface and groundwater differently. One possibility is that Congress 
regarded surface water and groundwater as separate resources and did 
not appreciate the existence of any relationship between the two. 
However, the legislative history does not support that hypothesis. The 
Senate committee report states explicitly that ―[t]he Committee 
recognizes the essential link between ground and surface waters and 
the artificial nature of any distinction.‖60 The Committee warned that 
―[t]he importance of groundwater in the hydrological cycle cannot be 
underestimated. Although only about 21.5 percent of our domestic, 
industrial agricultural supply comes directly from wells, it must be 
remembered that rivers, streams and lakes themselves are largely 
supplied with water from the ground—not surface runoff.‖61 The 
Committee criticized existing regulatory programs that confined their 
coverage to surface water bodies and rejected the premise that the 
control of surface water pollution would assure acceptable 
groundwater quality. Although the Committee did not regard 
groundwater pollution to be ―as serious a national problem at present 
as is surface water pollution, . . . groundwater availability and quality 
is [sic] deteriorating.‖62 It was concern over the growing threat to 
groundwater quality that prompted the Committee to support 
regulation of deep well disposal.
63
 
If Congress did not labor under the misimpression that 
groundwater could be safely ignored without impairing the CWA‘s 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. S. REP. NO. 92-414, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3739. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See id. The CWA requires each state that seeks permission to administer the NPDES 
permit program to demonstrate to EPA that its permit program provides adequate authority to 
control the disposal of pollutants into wells. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(D) (2006). 
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efforts to restore and maintain the integrity of aquatic ecosystems, 
why did it not clearly include discharges into groundwater within the 
scope of the Act‘s general regulatory coverage? One possibility is 
that it regarded the term ―waters of the United States‖ as sufficiently 
broad to include groundwater, precluding the need for more detailed 
specification. Some courts finding no coverage of groundwater cite a 
portion of the Senate committee report, however, that referred to the 
―complex and varied‖ nature of state jurisdiction over groundwater.64 
As indicated below,
65
 Congress was solicitous and protective of state 
authority to control land and water development.
66
 A decision to 
avoid general coverage of groundwater discharges would be 
consistent with that deference to state authority if a sweeping 
regulatory program covering groundwater discharges would in effect 
require land use control, an area of traditional state regulatory 
jurisdiction. In any event, it seems clear that Congress did not 
exclude groundwater discharges from the Act‘s coverage as a result 
of a misperception that groundwater pollution plays no role in efforts 
to protect surface water quality or the integrity of aquatic ecosystems. 
4. The Role of Nonpoint Source Pollution 
A second jurisdictional issue is more easily resolved than the 
applicability of the CWA to groundwater. The scope of the CWA‘s 
regulatory provisions turns heavily on the distinction between point 
sources and nonpoint sources. The Act‘s core provision applies 
exclusively to the activities of point sources,
67
 which the statute 
 
 64. Umatilla Waterquality Protective Ass‘n v. Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 
1312, 1318 (D. Or. 1997) (quoting S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 73 (1971), reprinted in 1972 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3739). The district court in Umatilla also supported its conclusion that the 
CWA does not cover groundwater by noting the ―new level of uncertainty and expense‖ that a 
contrary conclusion would add to the CWA permitting process and the possibility that 
groundwater coverage ―would expose potentially hundreds of . . . permittees to current or future 
litigation and legal liability if they or [the state permitting agency] has happened to make the 
‗wrong‘ choice about which kind of permit discharges to groundwater require.‖ Id. at 1320. 
These ―practical consequences‖ are of course irrelevant except to the extent they shed light on 
congressional intent on the question of groundwater coverage. 
 65. See infra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 66. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b), (g) (2006). 
 67. Again, section 301(a) of the CWA bars the unpermitted discharge of a pollutant. 33 
U.S.C. § 1311(a). The Act defines the ―discharge of a pollutant‖ as ―any addition of any 
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defines broadly as ―discernable, confined and discrete 
conveyances.‖68 The technology-based effluent limitations, the Act‘s 
first line of defense against harmful pollution,
69
 also apply only to 
point sources.
70
 The few provisions of the statute that apply to 
nonpoint sources
71
 do not create authority for the establishment of 
federally enforceable discharge limits.
72
 Instead, control of nonpoint 
sources is left almost entirely to state discretion.
73
 
Why did Congress draw such a distinct and significant line 
between point sources, which would be extensively regulated, and 
 
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.‖ Id. § 1362(12)(A). Consequently, the 
addition of pollutants to navigable waters from nonpoint sources does not qualify as discharge 
of pollutants. See also Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210, 
1226–27 (11th Cir. 2009) (―Non-point source pollution, chiefly runoff, is widely recognized as 
a serious water quality problem, but the NPDES program does not even address it.‖); cf. 
SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 143 (―Congress‘ principal goal in passing the CWA 
was to reduce discharges from point sources.‖). Environmental advocates have pressed for a 
more expansive application of the CWA to encompass nonpoint sources.
 
See Kristi Johnson, 
Comment, The Mythical Giant: Clean Water Act Section 401 and Nonpoint Source Pollution, 
29 ENVTL. L. 417, 418 (1999) (discussing efforts by environmentalist groups to use section 401 
of the CWA to regulate nonpoint sources). But the courts have refused to interpret the statute 
broadly to encompass nonpoint sources. See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 415 F.3d 
1121, 1124–25 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that ―the CWA does not require states to take 
regulatory action to limit the amount of non-point water pollution introduced into its 
waterways‖); Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1140 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding EPA can 
regulate nonpoint source pollution using total maximum daily loads, but implementation 
remains the responsibility of the states); Am. Wildlands v. Browner, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1161 
(D. Colo. 2000) (holding that states retain option, but are not required, to regulate nonpoint 
sources because Congress recognizes the difficulty of isolating responsible polluters), aff’d, 260 
F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 68. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2006). The statute specifically excludes agricultural stormwater 
discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture from the definition of a point source. Id. 
 69. See infra notes 92–97 and accompanying text. 
 70. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2006) (describing effluent limitations for point sources, or for 
categories and classes of point sources). The CWA also authorizes regulation of indirect 
dischargers, also known as industrial users. These are industrial sources of pollution that send 
their waste for treatment by publicly owned treatment works instead of discharging them 
directly into waters of the United States. See id. §§ 1314(g), 1317(b) (authorizing the adoption 
of pretreatment standards for indirect dischargers). 
 71. The CWA does not even define a nonpoint source. It therefore is defined by process of 
exclusion. If a source of surface water pollution is not a point source, it must be a nonpoint 
source. For examples of nonpoint sources, see id. § 1314(f). 
 72. See Jeffrey M. Gaba, New Sources, New Growth and the Clean Water Act, 55 ALA. L. 
REV. 651, 662 (2004) (―The provisions of the CWA that require control over the addition of 
pollutants by nonpoint sources are also simple. There, basically, are not any.‖). 
 73. See SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 153 (―The CWA effectively leaves the 
regulation of nonpoint pollution up to the individual states.‖). 
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nonpoint sources, whose control would remain within the discretion 
of the states? One possibility is that those who drafted the CWA were 
unaware of the scope of nonpoint source pollution or the degree to 
which it would affect efforts to restore and maintain ecosystem 
integrity.
74
 The CWA‘s legislative history, however, does not support 
the notion that legislators were blithely unaware that nonpoint source 
pollution was a significant contributor to the burden of surface water 
pollution that the CWA was designed to check. A House committee 
report refers to ―extensive testimony‖ during oversight hearings ―that 
nonpoint sources of pollutants could and would, in many cases, 
preclude the meeting of water quality standards. . . . The Committee 
clearly recognizes that non-point sources of pollution are a major 
contributor to water quality problems.‖75 
Rather, the decision to essentially exclude nonpoint sources from 
mandatory federal regulation stemmed from two other assumptions, 
one technical and the other political. The first was that the means of 
controlling (and measuring)
76
 nonpoint source pollution were not as 
readily available as those for point source pollution, thus making 
control of nonpoint source pollution a much tougher nut to crack.
77
 
 
 74. Cf. Rose, supra note 21, at 283–84 (―Some major polluters can be located easily, 
particularly those polluters already classed as point sources . . . . But many discharges cannot be 
located easily, and hence they may be overlooked entirely in regulatory systems for water 
pollution control. Many discharges come from run-off, i.e., the so-called nonpoint pollutants: 
sediment from construction, organic materials, pesticides from farms, and fertilizers from 
lawns.‖). 
 75. H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 102, 106 (1972); see also S. REP. 92-414, at 39 (1971), 
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3705. Professor Hines noted in 1966 that ―agriculture 
has joined the cities and industries as a major source of pollution.‖ Hines I, supra note 1, at 193. 
 76. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 21, at 279 (―The end of the pipe, or ‗point source‘ as it was 
called, was the place where pollution control performance could be measured easily.‖).  
 77. William L. Andreen, Water Quality Today—Has the Clean Water Act Been a 
Success?, 55 ALA. L. REV. 537, 562 (2004) [hereinafter Andreen, Water Quality Today], makes 
the point as follows: 
Not only would there be fewer and more obvious candidates for regulation, but point 
source discharges were amenable to end-of-pipe treatment, whereas the control of non-
point source pollution was often thought impractical and not properly subject to 
federal direction. What was the EPA supposed to do, tell farmers how to farm? 
Id. (citations omitted). See also Jonathan Cannon, A Bargain for Clean Water, 17 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 608, 616 (2008) (―It is difficult, although in at least some cases not impossible, to 
directly monitor discharges from non-point sources. Therefore, setting and enforcing discharge 
limitations on non-point sources of the sort typically applied to point sources, which require 
monitoring at the point of discharge, remains problematic.‖). 
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The second was that the diffuse nature of nonpoint source control, 
which does not emanate from an easily identified and convenient pipe 
or other conveyance upon which to slap technological controls, 
essentially requires the use of best management practices (―BMPs‖) 
rather than end-of-pipe technological fixes. Enforceable BMPs, in 
turn, are tantamount to land use controls. Because many legislators 
were committed to protecting the sovereignty of state and local 
governments to control land use, nonpoint source pollution seemed to 
extend federal regulation too far, even if the newly authorized federal 
technology-based controls for point sources did not.
78
 
Further, the decision to exclude nonpoint sources from mandatory 
federal regulation in 1972 was consistent with the notion that the 
CWA as initially adopted was an experiment whose impact and 
sufficiency would be reassessed as implementation proceeded.
79
 To 
facilitate evaluation of the CWA, Congress chose to require that EPA 
adopt guidelines to assist state pollution control agencies in 
identifying and evaluating the nature and extent of nonpoint source 
pollution and available processes and methods of controlling it.
80
 The 
House committee report warned that ―[i]f our water pollution 
problems are truly to be solved, we are going to have to vigorously 
address the problems of nonpoint sources.‖81 For that reason, the 
information-gathering provision concerning nonpoint sources was 
―among the most important in the 1972 Amendments.‖82 
5. The Role of Wetlands in Aquatic Ecosystems 
Yet another crucial coverage question concerns the applicability 
of the CWA to wetlands. The importance of wetlands to aquatic 
 
 78. See Cannon, supra note 77, at 616 (―The 1972 Congress may also have been 
influenced by the view that control of non-point source pollution is a form of land use control 
and that land use control rests traditionally with state and local governments, not with the 
federal government.‖). In fact, there is still no federal land use planning in the United States. 
Jonathan H. Adler, Once More with Feeling: Reaffirming the Limits of the Clean Water Act 
Jurisdiction, in THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CLEAN WATER ACT: FIVE ESSAYS 80, 82 (L. 
Kinvin Wroth ed., 2007). 
 79. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text (explaining why Congress was willing 
to adopt an unrealistic no discharge goal). 
 80. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(f) (2006). 
 81. H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 109 (1972). 
 82. Id. 
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ecosystems is beyond question.
83
 Among other things, wetlands filter 
out pollutants and purify and recharge groundwater, provide 
protection against storm surges in coastal areas, provide erosion 
protection, reduce flood damage, provide fish and wildlife habitat, 
and even mitigate global warming.
84
 The 1972 CWA included a 
program which has been used to control wetlands development—the 
section 404 dredge and fill permit program
85—even though the 
statute does not use the term wetlands.
86
 Judicial interpretations of the 
 
 83. See, e.g., LAZARUS, supra note 41, at 72 (stating that ―aquatic wetland areas that 
constitute the border between land and water are . . . invariably of great ecological value (and 
fragility)‖). The value of wetlands was not always appreciated, as the federal government 
previously viewed them as obstacles to progress and enacted policies attempting to eliminate 
them. Jonathan H. Adler, Swamp Rules: The End of Federal Wetland Regulation?, 22 
REGULATION 11 (1999), http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv22n2/swamprules.pdf 
[hereinafter Adler, Swamp Rules]. 
 84. See Marc C. Hebert, Coastal Restoration under CWPPRA and Property Rights Issues, 
57 LA. L. REV. 1165, 1169–70 (1997). Recognizing the importance of wetlands, some states 
began enacting wetland protection statutes in the 1960s, before federal regulation began. Oliver 
A. Houck & Michael Rolland, Federalism in Wetlands Regulation: A Consideration of 
Delegation of Clean Water Act Section 404 and Related Programs to the States, 52 MD. L. REV. 
1242, 1244–45 (1995); Christine A. Klein, The New Nuisance: An Antidote to Wetland Loss, 
Sprawl, and Global Warming, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1155, 1200–01 (2007). See, e.g., Adler, Swamp 
Rules, supra note 83, at 11. By the time federal regulation had begun in the mid-1970s, eleven 
inland states and every coastal state (except Texas) had wetland protections in place. 
COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., The Clean Water Act, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL SOURCE 45, 56 (1st 
ed. 2002), http://cei.org/pdf/2315.pdf (citing Robert Beck, The Movement in the United States 
to Restoration and Creation of Wetlands, 34 NAT. RESOURCES J. 781, 788–89 (1994)). 
 85. Section 404(a) allows the Secretary of the Army, through the Army Corps of 
Engineers, to issue permits for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable 
waters. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2006). Because the term pollutant includes materials such as 
dredged spoil, rock, and sand, id. § 1362(6), the discharge of dredged or fill material without 
such a permit would violate section 301(a)‘s prohibition on unpermitted discharges. See id. 
§ 1311(a). 
 86. See William L. Andreen & Shana Campbell Jones, The Clean Water Act: A Blueprint 
for Reform 38 (Center for Progressive Reform White Paper #802, July 2008), available at 
http://www.progressiveregulation.org/whitePapers.cfm. The 1972 statute did not refer directly 
to ―wetlands‖ or ―tributaries,‖ despite language defining the jurisdictional reach of section 13 of 
the Rivers and Harbors Act and the direct reference to ―wetlands‖ in the Coastal Zone 
Management Act of 1972. ECOLOGY OF FRESHWATER AND ESTUARINE WETLANDS 323 (Darold 
P. Batzer & Rebecca R. Sharitz eds., 2006). The Corps of Engineers‘ section 404 regulations 
initially did not cover discharges to wetlands, but the Corps amended those regulations to do so 
after the courts interpreted the scope of statutory coverage broadly. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. 
Council v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975) (ordering the agency to issue 
―regulations clearly recognizing the full regulatory mandate of the Water Act‖); Augusta 
Wilson, Note, Of Ponds and Pot: How Rapanos Ignored Raich and the Potential Role for 
Cooperative Federalism, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 453, 462–63 (2008) (explaining that, 
in response to the decision in Callaway, the Corps expanded its definition of ―navigable waters‖ 
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scope of the program have exacerbated rather than resolved the 
resulting confusion.
87
 The dredge-and-fill permit program apparently 
was designed to both protect wetlands and allow development of 
economically valuable properties with access to water.
88
 It failed, 
however, to enunciate a clear policy to guide the responsible agencies 
in striking that balance.
89
 Given the ecosystem services that wetlands 
provide, their preservation is consistent with and vital to achieving 
the statutory goals of restoring and maintaining the chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity of the nation‘s waters.90 But as 
Alyson Flournoy has noted, ―[o]ne turns to the statute for adequate 
direction on its purposes in vain. . . . [S]ection 404 is . . . a statute 
whose most frequently cited mission is to protect wetlands but which 
fails to mention wetlands. In section 404, Congress left key questions 
not only unanswered but unasked.‖91 As a result, the scientific and 
technical assumptions upon which Congress rested its creation of the 
dredge and fill permit program are shrouded in uncertainty. 
6. Technology-Based vs. Water Quality-Based Controls 
A final technical assumption that shaped the 1972 CWA is based 
on the history of pre-1972 federal water pollution control legislation. 
The CWA, unlike the Clean Air Act adopted in 1970, relies on 
technology-based discharge controls as its first line of defense against 
pollution, instead of on the achievement of ambient quality 
 
to include ―(1) tributaries of navigable waters; (2) interstate waters and their tributaries; (3) 
non-navigable intrastate waters whose use or misuse could affect interstate commerce, and; 
[sic] (4) all freshwater wetlands that were adjacent to waters covered under the Act‖). 
 87. See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); United States v. Robison, 
521 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Ala. 2007) (scathing denunciation of both Rapanos and the 
Eleventh Circuit‘s interpretation of it). 
 88. LAZARUS, supra note 41, at 72. 
 89. EPA has the authority to veto dredge-and-fill permits issued by the Corps of 
Engineers, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(j) (2006), although EPA rarely exercises that veto power. See 
Lance D. Wood, Section 404: Federal Wetlands Regulation Is Essential, NAT. RESOURCES & 
ENV‘T, Summer 1992, at 7, 55; Katharine J. Teter, Robert C. Widner & Carol Deck, Long Arm 
of Uncle Sam: Federal Environmental Issues in Siting Decisions, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV‘T, 
Winter 1993, at 9. 
 90. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006). 
 91. Alyson C. Flournoy, Section 404 at Thirty-Something: A Program in Search of a 
Policy, 55 ALA. L. REV. 607, 615–16 (2004). 
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standards.
92
 This choice flowed directly from the lessons legislators 
drew from experience with the pre-1972 legislation. That experience 
made it clear that available scientific knowledge was not adequate to 
identify cause-and-effect relationships between particular discharges 
and ambient water quality problems.
93
 The inability to make those 
causal links hampered federal and state policymakers both in 
selecting the effluent limitations to impose on individual dischargers 
and in demonstrating, for enforcement purposes, that particular 
dischargers had caused violations of state water quality standards.
94
 
The Senate committee report found that state environmental officials 
were still trying to establish relationships between pollutants and uses 
of receiving waters because of the great difficulty associated with 
establishing reliable and enforceable precise effluent limitations on 
the basis of a given stream quality. Water quality standards, in 
addition to their deficiencies in relying on the assimilative capacity of 
receiving waters, often cannot be translated into effluent limitations 
 
 92. Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (2006) (requiring compliance by point sources with 
technology-based effluent limitations), with 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2006) (authorizing EPA to adopt 
national ambient air quality standards). See also LAZARUS, supra note 41, at 177 (stating that 
technology-based standards were the CWA‘s ―first order of business‖); SALZMAN & 
THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 144 (―[T]he CWA reverses the approach of the CAA. Instead of 
setting ambient water concentrations and working backwards to determine individual emission 
levels, the CWA starts with individual effluent levels.‖). The Clean Air Act also contains 
performance standards, including the standards of performance that apply to new stationary 
sources, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2006), and the nationally uniform standards for controlling motor 
vehicle emissions, id. § 7521(a). These standards of performance provide some protection in the 
event that state implementation plans fail to achieve the national ambient air quality standards 
by the designated statutory deadlines. 
 93. See William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United 
States—State, Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789–1972: Part I, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 145, 158 
(2003) [hereinafter Andreen, Evolution I] (―This change [from an ambient quality-based 
approach] was crucial if water pollution was actually going to be tackled effectively within a 
reasonably prompt period of time since the implementation of water quality standards was 
fraught with so many technical and policy problems.‖). 
 94. See LAZARUS, supra note 41, at 72 (noting that ―Congress deliberately decided against 
having water quality standards be the primary basis for pollution control because of the sheer 
complexity of determining cause and effect of pollutants in aquatic systems‖ and that pre-1972 
experience indicated that regulation tied to cause-and-effect relationships between particular 
discharges and impacts on receiving water quality ―would quickly become mired in protracted 
factfinding and scientific uncertainty‖); SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 143–44 
(―[T]he problems that arose in implementing the 1965 Water Quality Act . . . convinced 
Congress that the states would find it difficult to translate water quality standards into numeric 
effluent limitations for individual point sources.‖). 
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that are defendable in court tests, because models for water quality 
are imprecise, and because effluents have strong effects in most 
waters. 
 Under this Act the basis of pollution prevention and 
elimination will be the application of effluent limitations. 
Water quality will be a measure of program effectiveness and 
performance, not a means of elimination and enforcement. 
 The Committee recommends the change to effluent limits 
as the best available mechanism to control water pollution. 
With effluent limits, the Administrator can require the best 
control technology; he need not search for a precise link 
between pollution and water quality.
95
 
The decision to achieve the CWA‘s goals primarily through the 
adoption and enforcement of technology-based effluent limitations 
that Congress directed EPA to develop and apply to point sources 
was thus a product of necessity. That decision emerged from the 
technical difficulties, revealed through experience with the pre-1972 
laws, in translating water quality standards into enforceable effluent 
limitations for individual dischargers. The switch to a technology-
based approach would facilitate enforcement by ―making it 
unnecessary to work backward from an overpolluted body of water to 
determine which point sources are responsible and which must be 
abated.‖96 The focus on technology-based controls was therefore 
pragmatic. In choosing to force point sources to reduce discharges to 
the extent it was technologically and economically feasible to do so, 
Congress essentially concluded that compliance with technology-
based controls would serve as a pragmatic surrogate for achieving the 
 
 95. S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3675. 
 96. EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 204 (1976); see 
also Andreen, Evolution II, supra note 24, at 270 (―One of the main reasons to create a system 
in which polluters would be assigned precise, technology-based permit limitations was to make 
the statute more easily enforceable. No longer would the Act limit enforcement to instances in 
which public health or welfare was endangered or where the government could show proof that 
a particular discharge had caused a particular violation of water quality standards.‖); Oliver A. 
Houck, Of Bats, Birds and B-A-T: The Convergent Evolution of Environmental Law, 63 MISS. 
L.J. 403, 417–18 (1994) [hereinafter Houck, Bats] (―[B]est available technology side-stepped 
the age-old and irresolvable arguments of whether ‗significant‘ harm existed and who was 
‗causing‘ it and began to abate the pollution itself.‖). 
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levels of discharge reductions needed to secure the Act‘s fishable-
swimmable waters goal as quickly as possible. But the focus on 
technology-based controls also appears to have reflected a moral 
judgment that polluters should be forced to reduce their discharges to 
the maximum amount that technology allowed.
97
 
B. Political and Social Policy Assumptions 
As the discussion in the previous Part indicates, the CWA of 1972 
was largely shaped by a series of scientific and technical assumptions 
under which Congress operated that affected the objectives, scope, 
and nature of the new legislation. That discussion also makes it clear 
that Congress grappled with more than just technical considerations. 
The CWA was the product of a series of contestable political and 
social policy assumptions, too.
98
 This Part explores additional 
assumptions of this kind, including those that determined the 
allocation of authority to control water pollution between EPA and 
the states and the respective roles of government and the public in 
overseeing implementation and enforcement of the statute‘s 
requirements. 
1. Cooperative Federalism 
Five years before Congress adopted the CWA, Professor Hines 
identified ―the central problem raised by substantial federal 
involvement in water quality control accomplishing national 
 
 97. See Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private Property 
Solution, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 533, 554 n.64 (2007) (discussing approach to controlling 
pollution that is based on ―a moral imperative that industries must reduce pollution as much as 
possible‖); see also Andreen, Evolution II, supra note 24, at 266 (asserting that the Senate 
Public Works Committee‘s decision to move to a technology-based approach was in part 
philosophical, premised on the idea that polluters no longer had the right to pollute or to rely on 
the assimilative capacity of receiving waters). The adoption of nationally uniform, technology-
based controls also reflects ―a moral argument that environmental risk exposure is involuntary 
and thus protection levels should be the same for all citizens, regardless of the cost of achieving 
them, and perhaps even higher for vulnerable populations. This argument is one of the 
fundamental principles of the environmental justice movement.‖ A Dan Tarlock, Safe Drinking 
Water: A Federalism Perspective, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y REV. 233, 250 (1997). 
 98. See, e.g., supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text (discussing Congress‘s 
unwillingness to require mandatory controls for nonpoint sources to avoid infringing on state 
and local regulatory prerogatives). 
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objectives of restoring water quality while maintaining appropriate 
respect for local institutions.‖99 Most of the pollution control statutes 
that Congress adopted during the 1970s, including the CWA, 
reflected a legislative commitment to the model of cooperative 
federalism, which involves ―shared governmental responsibilities for 
regulating private activity.‖100 That commitment is clearly enunciated 
in the statutory policy declaration to  
recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities 
and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, 
to plan the development and use (including restoration, 
preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources, 
and to consult with the Administrator [of EPA] in the exercise 
of his authority under [the CWA].
101
 
In addition, Congress declared a policy that state authority to allocate 
water quantities not be ―superseded, abrogated, or otherwise 
impaired‖102 by the enactment of the CWA. 
Although the effort to improve and protect water quality was to be 
a cooperative one, there is no question that Congress sought to 
significantly increase the federal government‘s role.103 Before 1972, 
Congress had relied on the states to ―lead the national effort to 
prevent, control and abate water pollution,‖ with the federal 
 
 99. Hines III, supra note 1, at 799; see also id. at 800 (arguing that ―reconciliation of the 
continually expanding federal involvement in water quality management with the policy of 
local program primacy has become increasingly difficult over the last decade‖); id. at 859 
(―Over the years, the most vexing issue raised by the activities of the federal government to 
improve water quality has been the proper relationship between local and federal water 
pollution abatement programs. Each attempt to broaden the federal involvement in water quality 
control has met with spirited resistance premised on the primacy of state rights in the pollution 
control field.‖). 
 100. Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse 
Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 737 (2006) 
(quoting 1 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL 
RESOURCES LAW § 5:3 (2d ed. 2007)). The article explores in depth the roots, aims, and fate of 
cooperative federalism in federal environmental legislation. Federalism issues can be traced 
back to the Constitution‘s treatment of the states as sovereigns that are distinct from the federal 
government. Id. at 722. 
 101. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2006). 
 102. Id. § 1251(g). 
 103. The U.S. Supreme Court has even called this approach ―taking a stick to the States.‖
 
Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 421 U.S. 60, 64 (1975). 
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government‘s role being limited to supporting and assisting the 
states.
104
 The new legislation would attempt to ―restore the balance of 
Federal-State effort‖ by, among other things, establishing ―a direct 
link between the Federal government and each industrial source of 
discharge into the navigable waters‖ through EPA‘s promulgation of 
nationally applicable, technology-based effluent limitations.
105
 Some 
believe that the impetus for heightening the federal role was ―the 
overriding perception that water quality was not improving, and that 
the states could not be depended on to improve the situation.‖106 The 
effect was to ―nationalize[] the business of water pollution control in 
the United States, relegating the states, whose authority had long 
dominated the area, to a largely secondary, supporting role.‖107 
Even though the partnership between EPA and the states was by 
no means an equal one, the states retained important authority and 
 
 104. S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3669. 
 105. Id., reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3675. Professor Hines stated in 1967 that 
although policymakers long assumed that local control was the most efficient means of dealing 
with water quality problems, ―[o]ver time, as the pollution problem has steadily worsened, the 
wisdom of this judgment increasingly has been called in question.‖ Hines III, supra note 1, at 
800. 
 106. Victor B. Flatt, A Dirty River Runs through It (The Failure of Enforcement in the 
Clean Water Act), 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 13 (1997). Others have noted that during the 
1950s and 1960s, ―state and local governments began to recognize the importance of 
environmental quality and adopted first generation environmental controls.‖
 
Adler, Fable, 
supra note 23, at 96. By 1966, every state had adopted some sort of water pollution legislation. 
Id. Professor Adler contends that the ―conventional fable is that federal environmental 
regulation was necessary because states failed to adopt adequate environmental measures,‖ but 
this perspective ―ignores the substantial environmental progress in many areas prior to the 
enactment of most major federal environmental laws.‖ Id. But see supra note 21. 
 Congress also relegated the Corps of Engineers, which had been responsible for 
administering the Refuse Act of 1899‘s permit program, to a supporting rather than starring role 
under the CWA. The House report professed ―the highest regard for the integrity and abilities of 
the Corps,‖ but stated that the President and Congress agreed when EPA was created  
that it would be the single agency responsible for leading the battle against pollution. 
Although other agencies such as the Corps have a tremendous role to play in this 
battle, it must be a supportive role. The administration of the extremely important 
[NPDES] permit program is not a supportive role. Indeed, this permit program as 
envisioned by the Committee may well be the most important facet of the new water 
pollution control program.  
H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 125 (1972). Accordingly, EPA, not the Corps, would supervise the 
NPDES permit program. The Corps remained responsible for issuing dredge-and-fill permits in 
the first instance, subject to EPA veto. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(j) (2006). 
 107. Andreen, Water Quality Today, supra note 77, at 537. 
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discretion.
108
 First, Congress afforded each state the option of 
applying to EPA for permission to administer the National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (―NPDES‖) permit program for point 
sources located within its jurisdiction. If a state permit program meets 
CWA requirements, EPA is obliged to approve it and withdraw from 
issuing NPDES permits in that state.
109
 Second, the Act preserves not 
only the authority and jurisdiction of the states to control water 
quantity allocation,
110
 but also the authority to adopt discharge 
controls for point sources that are more stringent than those adopted 
by EPA.
111
 Consequently, EPA‘s technology-based controls are floor, 
not ceiling, preemptive.
112
 The House committee responsible for 
adoption of the 1972 CWA noted the ―extreme importance in 
assuring the States of the right to adopt or enforce provisions at least 
as strict as those established in this legislation.‖113 
Third, Congress vested in the states the responsibility to adopt 
water quality standards (subject to EPA veto),
114
 despite the failure of 
 
 108. Despite this authority, Congress built several safeguards into the Act to deal with the 
possibility that states would not perform up to its expectations. As indicated below, for 
example, EPA retained the authority to veto individual state permits. 42 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2) 
(2006). Congress also authorized EPA to suspend or withdraw approval for state NPDES permit 
programs if a state fails to administer the program in accordance with its CWA responsibilities. 
Id. § 1342(c). Further, as indicated below, Congress subjected state water quality standards to 
veto by EPA and vested the federal agency with the power to promulgate standards for a state 
whose standards are not consistent with the CWA or if EPA determines that a federal standard 
is necessary to meet the requirements of the CWA. Id. § 1313(c)(4). 
 109. Id. § 1342(b). EPA retains the authority to veto individual state permits if it finds them 
to be ―outside the guidelines and requirements‖ of the CWA. Id. § 1342(d)(2). Congress also 
sought to allocate authority to issue (and veto) dredge-and-fill permits. See § 1344(g)–(j); H.R. 
REP. NO. 92-911, at 127 (1972) (―The Committee believes that the States ought to have the 
opportunity to assume the responsibilities that they have requested. If, however, a State fails to 
carry out its obligations and misuses the permit program, the Administrator is fully authorized 
. . . to withdraw his approval of a State program.‖). 
 110. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(b), (g), 1370(2) (2006). 
 111. Id. § 1370(1). The Act also preserves state power to address water pollution through 
common law remedies. Id. § 1365(e). 
 112. For discussion of the distinction between floor preemption (which precludes 
displacement of federal standards by weaker state standards) and ceiling preemption (which 
precludes displacement of federal standards by more stringent state standards), see Robert L. 
Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by 
Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
579, 583 (2008). 
 113. H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 136 (1972). 
 114. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (2006). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/5
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010]  Science, Politics, Law, and the Arc of the CWA 125 
 
 
the pre-1972 legislation that relied on a water quality-based approach 
to controlling water pollution. This time, however, water quality 
standards did not represent the sole or even first line of defense 
against water pollution. Instead, the state water quality standards 
would serve as safety nets in case EPA‘s technology-based effluent 
limitations failed to provide an acceptable level of water quality.
115
 
Once the water quality standards were in place, point sources would 
be obliged to comply with any effluent limitations more stringent 
than applicable technology-based controls to the extent necessary to 
assure compliance with the water quality standards.
116
 
Fourth, as discussed above,
117
 water allocation and quantity 
remained the prerogatives of the states. Finally, Congress‘s failure to 
mandate control for nonpoint sources essentially left it up to the 
states to determine whether and how to control runoff from those 
sources. Congress chose to steer clear of significant federal 
involvement in both of these areas because of its desire to avoid 
intruding on the exercise of traditional state police power 
prerogatives in applying land use controls and administering 
allocative water law.
118
 
2. Supplemental Citizen Enforcement 
One of the glaring deficiencies of the pre-1972 water pollution 
control legislation was the weakness of its enforcement 
 
 115. The House Committee explained the function of state water quality standards as 
follows: 
Even though section 301(b)(1) (A) and (B) requires the setting of effluent limitations 
consistent with best practicable control technology currently available, the Committee 
intends that if the sum of the discharges from point sources meeting such effluent 
limitations would preclude the meeting of water quality standards in existence on the 
date of enactment of the 1972 Amendments, or those promulgated pursuant to section 
303, new and more stringent effluent limitations would have to be established 
consistent with such water quality standards. 
H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 101–02 (1972); see also id. at 105 (―Water quality standards will be 
utilized for the purpose of setting effluent limitations in those cases where effluent limitations 
for point sources would not be consistent with such standards.‖). 
 116. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (2006). 
 117. See supra notes 110–11 and accompanying text. 
 118. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2006) (stating policy to preserve state rights to plan the 
development and use of water resources). 
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mechanism.
119
 Congress set out to strengthen the enforcement 
process by, among other things, endowing concurrent enforcement 
authority to EPA and the states.
120
 In addition, it crafted a citizen suit 
provision, which enables individuals and public interest groups to sue 
either point sources alleged to be in violation of their regulatory 
obligations or EPA if it fails to perform a nondiscretionary duty.
121
 
Citizen suits provide a safety valve in the event that federal and state 
regulators fail to enforce the law vigorously, whether as a result of 
cooptation by regulated entities
122
 or funding or personnel 
deficiencies.
123
  
 
 119. See William L. Andreen, Motivating Enforcement: Institutional Culture and the Clean 
Water Act, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 67, 68 (2007) [hereinafter Andreen, Institutional Culture] 
(―The pre-1972 federal water pollution control program had languished for years due to spotty 
and ineffectual efforts to exact compliance with its water quality objectives. Thoroughly 
disenchanted with that pattern of impotence, Congress set out to cure the problem, not only by 
establishing an enforceable pollution control strategy, but also by strengthening the 
enforcement process itself.‖). 
 120. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2006). 
 121. Id. § 1365 (2006). For discussion of the impact of citizen suits under federal 
environmental legislation to force agencies to perform nondiscretionary duties, see Robert L. 
Glicksman, The Value of Agency-Forcing Citizen Suits to Enforce Nondiscretionary Duties, 10 
WIDENER L. REV. 353 (2004) [hereinafter Glicksman, Agency-Forcing]. 
 122. See, e.g., Glicksman, Agency-Forcing, supra note 121, at 383–85; Matthew D. Zinn, 
Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 81 (2002); see also Andreen, Evolution II, supra note 24, at 286 (asserting 
that the CWA‘s citizen suit provision is one of several in the statute that reflect ―Congress‘ 
skepticism about EPA‘s ability or even the willingness of EPA or any expert administrative 
agency to continuously and vigorously perform its regulatory mission‖). 
 123. See Andreen & Jones, supra note 86, at 44 (―[F]rom 1997 to 2007 . . . enforcement 
funding to EPA regions decreased 8 percent in inflation-adjusted terms, and regional officials 
report that they reduced the number of enforcement staff by about 5 percent to address funding 
shortages.‖); cf. James R. May, Now More than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits at 
30, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 1, 1 (2003) (arguing that the Clean Air Act‘s citizen suit provision, 
adopted in 1970, was ―borne in a fulcrum of necessity due to inadequate resources and 
resolve‖). Professor May finds citizen suits under the environmental statutes generally to have 
been a resounding success: 
 Citizens suits work; they have transformed the environmental movement, and with 
it, society. Citizen suits have secured compliance by myriad agencies and thousands of 
polluting facilities [and] diminished pounds of pollution produced by the billions . . . . 
The foregone monetary value of citizen enforcement has conserved innumerable 
agency resources and saved taxpayers billions. 
Id. at 3–4 (citations omitted). Professor May‘s article compares the number of EPA referrals to 
the Department of Justice for civil enforcement compared to citizen suits under the CWA for 
the period 1995–2002, and the number of consent decrees reached in government enforcement 
actions and citizen suits for the period 1995–2001. Id. at 42–43. He concludes that citizen suits, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/5
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010]  Science, Politics, Law, and the Arc of the CWA 127 
 
 
The House report explained that it intended plaintiffs in citizen 
suits to act as ―private attorneys general‖ and that the citizen suit 
provision would ―provide[] an open door for those who have 
legitimate interests in the courts, and encourages more meaningful 
participation in the administrative processes.‖124 The Senate report 
added that plaintiffs in citizen suits would perform ―a public service‖ 
and authorized courts to award litigation costs
125
 to prevailing 
plaintiffs in recognition of that role.
126
 
C. Legal Assumptions 
One final key assumption that Congress relied on in adopting the 
1972 CWA concerned the scope of its authority to regulate the 
activities responsible for causing impaired water quality. The core 
provision of the CWA prohibits the unpermitted discharge of 
pollutants.
127
 The Act defines such a discharge as the ―addition of 
pollutant[s] to ‗navigable waters‘ from any point source.‖128 As the 
discussion above indicates, judicial treatment, especially by the 
Supreme Court, of the statutory term ―navigable waters‖ has 
engendered chaos. Although the Court has never invalidated the 
CWA or held that its application to a particular discharge is 
unconstitutional, it has relied on concerns that the Act‘s application 
to intrastate waters and isolated wetlands might exceed the bounds of 
Congress‘s authority under the Commerce Clause129 as a justification 
for interpreting the scope of the dredge and fill permit program 
narrowly.
130
 
 
which are filed at the rate of at least once a week, generally ―help advance the rule of law and 
keep agencies honest.‖ Id. at 47. 
 124. H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 134 (1972); see also May, supra note 123, at 6–7 (describing 
how citizen suits enhance public participation). 
 125. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2006) (authorizing courts in citizen suits to award litigation 
costs, including attorney fees, to prevailing or substantially prevailing parties when a court 
determines that it is appropriate to do so). 
 126. See S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3747. 
 127. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006). 
 128. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A) (2006). 
 129. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 130. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (plurality opinion) (―[T]he 
Corps‘ interpretation [of ―navigable waters‖] stretches the outer limits of Congress‘s commerce 
power and raises difficult questions about the ultimate scope of that power‖); Solid Waste 
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The CWA‘s drafters seemed to have had no concern that the 
anticipated broad coverage of the Act‘s discharge prohibitions and 
permit programs might run afoul of any limits on federal regulatory 
power derived from the Commerce Clause. The House report, with 
considerable prescience, expressed reluctance about using the term 
―navigable waters‖ lest it be interpreted narrowly by the courts. The 
Committee stated: 
One term that the Committee was reluctant to define was the 
term ―navigable waters.‖ The reluctance was based on the fear 
that any interpretation would be read narrowly. However, this 
is not the Committee‘s intent. The Committee fully intends that 
the term ―navigable waters‖ be given the broadest possible 
constitutional interpretation unencumbered by agency 
determinations which have been made or may be made for 
administrative purposes.
131
 
 Similarly, a Senate report explained that the Act was consciously 
drafted to avoid the narrow interpretations of the scope of regulatory 
jurisdiction that had helped thwart implementation of the 1965 Water 
Quality Act.
132
 According to the report, such broad applicability was 
necessary to achieve the statute‘s goals because ―[w]ater moves in 
hydrologic cycles and it is essential that discharge of pollutants be 
controlled at the source. Therefore, reference to the control 
requirements must be made to the navigable waters, portions thereof, 
and their tributaries.‖133 The Conference Committee confirmed its 
intent to afford the term ―navigable waters‖ ―the broadest possible 
constitutional interpretation.‖134 
 
Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng‘rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172–74 
(2001) (identifying ―significant constitutional questions‖ in broad interpretation of the scope of 
the dredge and fill permit program). Some lower courts have gone further. See, e.g., United 
States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 257 (4th Cir. 1997) (invalidating Corps‘ regulatory definition of 
―waters of the United States‖ to the extent that it authorized regulation of intrastate, 
nonnavigable waters ―which could affect interstate commerce‖). 
 131. H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 131 (1972). 
 132. S. REP. NO. 92-1236, at 144 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3776 
(Conf. Rep.). 
 133. S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3742–43. 
 134. S. REP. NO. 92-1236, at 144 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3776, 3882 
(Conf. Rep.). 
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The legislative record does not appear to provide any basis for 
believing that legislators doubted the adequacy of congressional 
power to cover all relevant portions of the hydrological cycle (at least 
with respect to surface waters).
135
 The concern was that courts might 
interpret the scope of the statute more narrowly than Congress 
intended, not that courts would find that the intended scope 
outstripped delegated legislative authority under the Constitution. But 
the Supreme Court‘s decisions in Lopez and Morrison later raised 
doubts about the limits of congressional power under the Commerce 
Clause that did not exist when Congress adopted the CWA in 1972.
136
 
Those newly enunciated limits eventually prompted the Court to 
interpret the intended scope of the CWA narrowly to avoid raising 
constitutional federalism questions. 
III. THE REALITY OF CWA IMPLEMENTATION 
Congress based its quest ―to restore and maintain the chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation‘s waters‖137 on the 
premises discussed in Part II above. More than three-and-a-half 
decades later, pollutant discharges have not been eliminated and not 
all surface water bodies have achieved fishable-swimmable status. 
Nevertheless, significant progress toward these goals has been made. 
This Part briefly assesses the CWA‘s impact on surface water 
pollution and aquatic ecosystems and explores what the Act‘s fate 
illuminates about the initial assumptions under which it was enacted. 
 
 135. But cf. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 731–32 (2006) (plurality opinion) 
(noting that ―the CWA authorizes federal jurisdiction only over ‗waters,‘‖ and that ―[t]he only 
natural definition of the term ‗waters,‘ our prior and subsequent judicial constructions of it, 
clear evidence from other provisions of the statute, and this Court‘s canons of construction all 
confirm that ‗the waters of the United States‘ in § 1362(7) cannot bear the expansive meaning 
that the Corps would give it‖ in extending it to certain wetlands adjacent to traditionally 
navigable waters). 
 136. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 
(1995). Both decisions invalidated federal legislation as beyond the scope of the Commerce 
Clause, a result that, before Lopez, the Supreme Court had not reached in decades. 
 137. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006). 
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A. The CWA’s Impact on Pollution and Wetlands Protection 
By all accounts, the CWA has made significant inroads into the 
nation‘s water pollution problems. EPA reported in 2002 that the 
statute‘s technology-based effluent limitations, as applied to point 
sources through the NPDES permit program, ―has achieved 
tremendous success in controlling point source pollution and 
restoring the nation‘s waters. By 1990 over eighty-seven percent of 
the major municipal facilities and ninety-three percent of major 
industrial facilities were in compliance with NPDES permit 
limits.‖138 Despite treating one-third more waste, discharges of 
organic wastes from publicly owned waste treatment facilities have 
dropped twenty-three percent, while similar discharges from 
industrial facilities have decreased forty percent.
139
 Further, as Bill 
Andreen notes: 
Dissolved oxygen levels have increased downstream from 
point source discharges all over the country, and the 
improvements are so significant that they can often be 
discerned throughout entire river basins. The greatest 
improvements, however, can be seen in many rivers and lakes 
located in urban, industrialized areas, which in the past 
suffered most from point source discharges. Truly 
extraordinary progress, therefore, has been experienced in 
places as diverse as the Delaware estuary and the 
Chattahoochee River, New York Harbor, and the Potomac 
estuary. The progress, moreover, is not limited to just 
conventional pollutants, but includes heavy metals and toxic 
water pollutants.
140
 
As Oliver Houck put it, ―[t]he 1972 Amendments worked. . . . By any 
measure—number of dischargers on permit, pounds of pollution 
abated, stream segments improved, fisheries restored to waters where 
 
 138. U.S. EPA, OFFICE OF WATER, PROPOSED WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY (2002), 
quoted in GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 580. 
 139. See William L. Andreen, Delegated Federalism Versus Devolution: Some Insights 
from the History of Water Pollution Control, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND 
REALITY OF FEDERALISM‘S CORE QUESTION 257, 272 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009). 
 140. Andreen, Water Quality Today, supra note 77, at 591. 
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they had not been seen for decades—the Act has made its case in 
court and, by its imitation, to the world.‖141  
Further, there seems to be widespread agreement that the decision 
to rely on technology-based controls instead of an ambient quality-
based approach as the principal tool for cleaning up the nation‘s 
waters was a wise one. In general, EPA has had relatively little 
difficulty identifying available technologies for the purpose of 
establishing effluent limitations, and the elimination of the need to 
prove a causal link between individual discharges and impaired water 
quality has facilitated enforcement.
142
 Moreover, the improvements in 
water quality traceable to the adoption and implementation of the 
CWA have proven to be affordable.
143
  
The picture is not entirely rosy, though. A significant percentage 
of surface water bodies continue to have water quality that is 
impaired and unsuitable for the uses designated for them under state 
water quality standards.
144
 More than 240 million pounds of toxic 
chemicals were discharged into the nation‘s waters in 2005, with 
approximately fifty-one million pounds having been released from 
municipal sewage plants incapable of handling the materials sent to 
them by indirect industrial dischargers covered by the CWA‘s 
pretreatment program. According to one source, ―[t]he pretreatment 
 
 141. OLIVER HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY, AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 3–4 (1st ed. 1999). 
 142. See SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 152; see also Andreen, Water Quality 
Today, supra note 77, at 546 (asserting that ―implementation of technology-based effluent 
limitations . . . has worked and worked well‖). Professor Andreen adds that, ―[s]etting aside the 
question of whether the use of technology-based limitations is the most efficient strategy in 
some theoretical sense, they have produced positive, tangible results when most of the other 
proposals have either never been tried in this country or have failed.‖ Andreen, Water Quality 
Today, supra note 77, at 546. 
 143. See Andreen, Water Quality Today, supra note 77, at 542–43 (―[Substantial reductions 
in water pollution] ha[ve] been accomplished without causing any significant harm to the 
economy in terms of employment or growth or investment. It is an amazing success story—a 
tribute to a regulatory system, which, despite its blemishes, does not deserve all of the criticism 
that has been hurled in its direction.‖).  
 144. EPA concluded in an inventory of water quality conducted in 2000 that only about 
sixty percent of assessed stream miles, fifty-five percent of assessed lake acres, and fifty 
percent of assessed estuarine miles fully support the designated uses. GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra 
note 3, at 580; see also Cannon, supra note 77, at 610; SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 19, 
at 142 (―The CWA in fact has come nowhere close to meeting its goal. Over a third of the 
waterways surveyed in 2000 still were not fishable and swimmable.‖).  
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program under the CWA is widely regarded as a failure. Many 
facilities simply fail to meet pretreatment standards and enforcement 
[by local governments] is lax,‖ both because of a lack of political will 
and the difficulty of identifying the indirect dischargers responsible 
for interfering with the treatment processes of publicly owned 
treatment works.
145
 The rate at which direct dischargers violate their 
NPDES permits is also alarmingly high.
146
 
The largest culprit in the nation‘s remaining surface water quality 
problems, however, is nonpoint source pollution. By the 1980s, as 
EPA‘s technology-based effluent limitations and NPDES permit 
programs made a significant dent in point source pollution, nonpoint 
source pollution had become the largest contributor to surface water 
pollution in the United States.
147
 In 2002, EPA reported that nonpoint 
source pollution was the leading cause of the siltation, nutrients, 
bacteria, metals (primarily mercury), and oxygen-depleting 
substances that are responsible for continued impairment of our 
surface waters.
148
 Nonpoint source pollution is responsible for up to 
three-quarters of the pollution in the waters with the poorest quality, 
with agricultural activities leading the list as the largest source of 
nonpoint source pollution.
149
 J.B. Ruhl, who has studied the role of 
 
 145. Andreen & Jones, supra note 86, at 16. 
 146. One report found that  
[d]uring 2005, more than 3600 major facilities (57 percent of about 7000) exceeded 
their permit discharge limits at least once. Astoundingly, also during 2005, 628 major 
facilities reported violating their permit requirements in at least half of their monthly 
reports. When major facilities exceed their permits, they, on average, exceed them by 
four times the permitted amount.‖  
Id. at 17. Similarly, the New York Times reported in 2009 that more than 500,000 known 
violations of the CWA occurred between 2004 and 2007 by more than 23,000 facilities. Those 
figures probably underestimated the scale of the problem because some facilities engaged in 
illegal discharges fail to inform the government of these violations. According to the Times, the 
number of facilities violating the CWA increased by more than sixteen percent between 2004 
and 2007. About sixty percent of those violations qualified as ―significant,‖ a term used to 
identify violations posing the highest public health or environmental risks. Charles Duhigg, 
Pollution Grows with Little Fear of Punishment, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2009, at A1. 
 147. See SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 153. 
 148. U.S. EPA, NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY: 2000 REPORT ES-3 (2002), cited 
in GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 581; see also Cannon, supra note 77, at 609–10 
(discussing nationwide trends in dissolved oxygen concentrations in 2000). 
 149. According to J.B. Ruhl: 
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agriculture in surface water pollution extensively, charges that 
―[e]fforts to address nonpoint source water pollution in the CWA and 
other statutes have been feeble, unfocused, and underfunded.‖150  
These figures and accounts confirm Congress‘s understanding in 
1972 that the achievement of adequate water quality depended on the 
control of nonpoint sources and condemn its failure to codify an 
adequate mechanism for doing so. Two prominent environmental law 
scholars have drawn the conclusion that ―one inevitably is left with 
the conclusion that politics has driven the CWA‘s failure to take on 
nonpoint pollution in any meaningful way. The agricultural lobby, in 
particular, has been very successful in weakening or killing off 
proposals to regulate nonpoint pollution more rigorously.‖151 
The status of efforts to protect wetlands ecosystems is also a 
mixed bag. By one account, since the adoption of the CWA in 1972, 
the rate at which wetlands are lost has declined about ninety 
percent.
152
 The CWA‘s dredge and fill permit program, together with 
conservation programs administered by the Department of 
Agriculture,
153
 cut annual wetland losses in the United States from an 
average of 555,000 acres in the mid-1970s to about 58,500 acres 
twenty years later.
154
 Yet, according to one account, ―experts are 
virtually unanimous that the biggest problem facing aquatic 
 
[f]arms are the major source of nonpoint water pollution nationally, with farm runoff 
acting as a primary transport mechanism for fertilizers, animal wastes, pesticides, 
sediments, and bacteria. For example, commercial fertilizers in farm runoff have 
widespread and pernicious effects, leading to eutrophication as the nutrient laden 
runoff promotes rapid algal and plant growth, and attendant consequent depletion of 
oxygen resources. 
J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
263, 288 (2000); see also Cannon, supra note 77, at 611 (claiming that ―[w]ater quality 
problems attributable to rural non-point source pollution continue to be pervasive‖). 
 150. Ruhl, supra note 149, at 298; see also Cannon, supra note 77, at 611 (―Lack of 
effective management of agricultural non-point source pollution remains the central problem of 
national water quality policy.‖). 
 151. SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 154; see also Cannon, supra note 77, at 
622 (―The coalition that successfully prevented regulation of non-point sources in 1972 remains 
intact and has successfully resisted much more modest efforts since then to bring non-point 
sources under some level of management.‖). 
 152. See Andreen, Water Quality Today, supra note 77, at 592. 
 153. For discussion of some of those programs, see 2 & 3 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra 
note 100, §§ 19:26, 27:6. 
 154. Andreen & Jones, supra note 86, at 34. 
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ecosystems is not pollution, but the destruction and alteration of 
aquatic habitats.‖155 Alyson Flournoy has gone so far as to suggest 
that it is de facto national policy to ―allow the destruction of wetlands 
at a steady pace.‖156 This sorry state of affairs may be attributed to 
factors that include the absence of appropriate oversight of activities 
conducted under dredge-and-fill permits, particularly requirements 
that permit holders mitigate wetlands losses,
157
 and to the shifting 
jurisdictional parameters of the section 404 program (aided and 
abetted by the splintered and confusing treatment afforded the 
meaning of ―navigable waters‖ by the Supreme Court).158 It is not 
much of a stretch to conclude that the amorphous nature of the goals 
of the section 404 program and Congress‘s failure even to mention 
wetlands in the text of the 1972 Act have impaired efforts to protect 
aquatic ecosystems. 
B. The Impact of Cooperative Federalism 
Congress‘s decision to enhance the federal government‘s role in 
administering national water pollution control legislation has paid 
significant dividends. The 1972 legislation has performed much 
better than did its 1948 and 1965 predecessors. As the discussion 
above indicates, the nationally uniform technology-based effluent 
limitations for point sources that form the core of the CWA‘s efforts 
to combat water pollution, which have performed admirably, are 
largely responsible for that success.
159
 But the states have not 
forfeited their role in the process of improving water quality. More 
 
 155. Robert W. Adler, Restoring the Environment and Restoring Democracy: Lessons from 
the Colorado River, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 61 (2007); cf. Houck & Rolland, supra note 84, at 
1245 (―[A] loss of fifty percent of America's remaining wetlands would result in increased 
sewage treatment plant expenditures of up to $75 billion for the removal of a single pollutant, 
nitrogen, alone.‖). 
 156. Flournoy, supra note 91, at 610. This characterization is ironic considering the 
longstanding commitment to ―no net loss‖ of wetlands. See generally James Salzman & J.B. 
Ruhl, ―No Net Loss‖—Instrument Choice in Wetlands Protection, Duke Science, Technology 
& Innovation Paper No. 1 (2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=796771. 
 157. See Andreen & Jones, supra note 86, at 39. 
 158. For a discussion of the Supreme Court‘s treatment of the ―navigable waters‖ language 
in the CWA, see supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text. 
 159. See supra notes 92–97, 142 and accompanying text. 
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than forty states have taken up Congress on its invitation to 
administer the NPDES permit program in lieu of EPA.
160
 
If anything, the statutory programs controlled by the states in the 
first instance have increased in importance in recent years. As EPA 
brought more and more point sources under the umbrella of the 
technology-based effluent limitations, it became increasingly clear 
that some surface water bodies resisted the improvements envisioned 
by the CWA. Many surface water bodies failed to comply with state 
water quality standards, despite implementation of technology-based 
controls for point sources, largely because of continuing nonpoint 
source pollution. The statutory safety net—in the form of the state 
water quality standards—has therefore taken on a larger role.161 On 
the one hand, the increasing importance of the state water quality 
standard program makes Congress‘s decision not to rely entirely on 
technology-based controls, despite the failure of an ambient quality-
based approach before 1972, look like a smart one. On the other 
hand, had Congress created an effective mechanism for controlling 
nonpoint source pollution (such as by requiring states to fashion and 
enforce best management practices for nonpoint sources), a statutory 
safety net may not have been as necessary.
162
 
State efforts to implement the water quality standard program 
have not gone smoothly. The statute requires that states with surface 
water bodies that do not satisfy state water quality standards (known 
 
 160. See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), State Program Status, 
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/statestats.cfm (last visited Apr. 25, 2010).  
 161. See GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 652–53. 
 162. Even with more effective control of nonpoint sources, a safety net in the form of water 
quality standards still would have been useful in protecting water bodies into which multiple 
sources discharge and water bodies that have low stream flow, so that discharges concentrate to 
a greater extent than they do in rivers and streams with higher flow levels. See, e.g., City of 
Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 419 n.4 (10th Cir. 1996) (―Water quality standards 
supplement technology-based effluent limitations guidelines ‗so that numerous point sources, 
despite individual compliance with effluent limitations, may be further regulated to prevent 
water quality from falling below acceptable levels.‘‖ (quoting EPA v. California ex rel. State 
Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 205 n.12 (1976))); cf. Michael M. Wenig, How ―Total‖ 
Are ―Total Maximum Daily Loads‖?—Legal Issues Regarding the Scope of Watershed-Based 
Pollution Control under the Clean Water Act, 12 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 87, 176–77 (1998) (arguing 
that it is impossible to determine whether nonpoint source pollution has a relatively small 
impact on water quality without addressing whether that load is large enough, in conjunction 
with point source discharges, to cause exceedances of the applicable water quality standards 
during low flows). 
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as impaired waters) adopt total maximum daily loads (―TMDLs‖).163 
A TMDL represents the maximum assimilative capacity of the 
receiving water body to which it applies; aggregate discharges above 
the TMDL will result in pollutant concentrations higher than those 
deemed necessary to achieve the designated use.
164
 States must limit 
aggregate discharges by point and nonpoint sources to an amount 
equal to or less than that allowed by the TMDL. But many states 
ignored their TMDL designation responsibilities for reasons that 
include funding shortages and a lack of political will.
165
 To combat 
this torpor, environmental groups resorted to citizen suits in which 
they sought court orders mandating that EPA fulfill its 
nondiscretionary duty to promulgate TMDLs for states that have 
failed to do so.
166
 Although the results in these suits have been 
mixed,
167
 there is little question that implementation of the TMDL 
program would be even further behind if not for the availability of 
citizen suits to spur recalcitrant agencies to perform their water 
quality-related obligations.
168
 This outcome seems to support the 
 
 163. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2006). 
 164. GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 663–65; see also Michael P. Healy, Still Dirty 
after Twenty-Five Years: Water Quality Standard Enforcement and the Availability of Citizen 
Suits, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 393, 405 (1997) (―A TMDL defines the maximum amount of a 
pollutant that a body of water can receive from all point and nonpoint sources each day before a 
violation of a state WQS will occur.‖). 
 165. See John T. Holleman, In Arkansas Which Comes First, the Chicken or the 
Environment?, 6 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 58 (1992) (claiming that ―the true genesis‖ of the 
difficulty in setting TMDLs stems from the ―‗acutely political judgment as to who's ox will be 
gored‘‖ (quoting Oliver A. Houck, The Regulation of Toxic Pollutants under the Clean Water 
Act, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,528, 10,546 (1991)); Murchison, supra note 21, at 573–74; Cynthia 
D. Norgart, Florida’s Impaired Waters Rule: Is There a ―Method‖ to the Madness?, 19 J. LAND 
USE & ENVTL. L. 347, 353–54 (2004); Jason Malinsky, Note, Balancing the Pollution Budget 
after Friends of the Earth v. EPA, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 861, 868 (2007).  
 166. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2) (2006). 
 167. Compare May, supra note 123, at 29 (stating that the TMDL citizen suit litigation 
―illustrates the reluctance of courts to force agency action absent a date-certain deadline‖), with 
Healy, supra note 164, at 425 n.158 (―Recent district court decisions suggest however that there 
may be a limit to the willingness of courts to accept long delays and unspecified deadlines for 
defining TMDLs. The fact remains that TMDL delays continue to contribute to WQS 
compliance problems.‖), and June F. Harrigan-Lum & Arnold L. Lum, Hawaii’s TMDL 
Program: Legal Requirements and Environmental Realities, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV‘T 12, 
13 (2000) (―The courts have also displayed impatience with state-proffered reasons relating to 
substantive matters, perceiving them instead as delays in submitting TMDLs.‖). 
 168. See HOUCK, supra note 141, at 5 (―[A] series of federal court cases in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s began to crack the defenses. . . . A wave of litigation followed, state by state, 
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value of Congress‘s choice to include in the CWA a citizen suit 
provision as a means of combating agency inertia. 
CONCLUSION 
The lofty goals Congress set when it adopted the CWA have not 
yet been met, although significant progress toward them has 
occurred. It is not the function of this Article to assay what the next 
steps should be in moving to complete the journey toward a no-
discharge world in which aquatic ecosystems thrive; that is the 
assigned task of Robert Adler, the author of the companion piece to 
this Article in this volume. Several points seem obvious, however. 
First, it will take more to eliminate the impaired status of those water 
bodies that do not currently meet state water quality standards than 
cracking down harder on point sources through more rigorous 
technology-based controls (although better enforcement of existing 
permits and the effluent limitations they contain would help). Instead, 
a meaningful system of controlling nonpoint sources is essential. 
Congress must work with state and local governments to overcome 
the political barriers that thus far have thwarted efforts to extract 
from nonpoint sources the same commitments to reducing discharges 
that the CWA already has demanded of point sources. Second, a 
resolution of the definitional quandary over what kinds of waters and 
wetlands the CWA covers is essential. It is imperative to dispel the 
current ―‗miasma of uncertainty‘‖169 cast over the meaning of 
―navigable waters‖ and ―waters of the United States‖ by the Supreme 
Court‘s fractured and confounding opinions in Solid Waste Agency of 
Northern Cook County and Rapanos.
170
 
One possible approach to dealing with both of those issues is to 
focus on protecting the integrity of watersheds. EPA has defined a 
watershed-based approach as one that ―‗focuses multi-stakeholder 
efforts within hydrologically defined boundaries to protect and 
 
compelling listings of impaired waters and schedules for first-ever TMDLs.‖). 
 169. See Cyrus P.W. Rieck, Note, How to Deal with Laboratory Reports under Crawford v. 
Washington: A Question with No Good Answer, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 839, 839 (2008) (quoting 
United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 55 (1st. Cir. 2005)). 
 170. See supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text. 
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restore our aquatic resources and ecosystems.‘‖171 The agency has 
identified several basic components of a watershed-based effort to 
improve water quality. These include the division of the states into 
natural geographic management areas; the adoption of phased 
regulatory and non-regulatory actions within each watershed area, 
including monitoring, assessment, planning, and implementation; the 
integration of CWA and other water resource programs; and a 
process that enables stakeholder participation.
172
 A watershed-
oriented focus makes sense because, as Holly Doremus has pointed 
out, ―‗[t]he core of the current problem is . . . our failure to bridge the 
land-water interface and other artificial boundaries we‘ve 
created.‘‖173 Whether TMDLs can provide the ―backbone‖ of such a 
watershed-based approach
174
 or a different approach is needed is a 
question that is beyond the scope of our assignment for this 
symposium, but it will be interesting to see how the answer crafted 
by environmental policymakers in the coming years conforms to the 
initial assumptions on which the CWA was enacted. 
 
 171. GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 693–94 (quoting Memorandum from G. Tracy 
Mehan, III, U.S. EPA Assistant Administrator, Office of Water, Committing EPA‘s Water 
Program to Advancing the Watershed Approach (Dec. 3, 2002)). 
 172. Id. at 694 (citing U.S. EPA, A REVIEW OF STATEWIDE WATERSHED MANAGEMENT 
APPROACHES, FINAL REPORT 1 (2002)). 
 173. Andreen & Jones, supra note 86, at 8–9 (quoting Holly Doremus, Crossing 
Boundaries: Commentary on ―The Law at the Water’s Edge,‖ in WET GROWTH: SHOULD 
WATER LAW CONTROL LAND USE? 271 (Craig Anthony (―Tony‖) Arnold ed., 2005)); see also 
Robert W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 
23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 204 (1999) (urging ―a comprehensive, watershed-based 
approach to aquatic ecosystem restoration and protection to augment the nation‘s water 
pollution control strategy‖) (citations omitted). 
 174. See Adler, Integrated Approaches, supra note 173, at 205. 
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